What comes after rationality? Adventure!

Before I asked “(…) [W]hat comes after rationality? Is it postrationality? What is post-formal operations like? What does transrationality look like?”

In this essay I start sketching out a path to answer this question. I first give away a bit of my personal history and the history of my interest in this question. I give a hypothesis of an answer. I then summarise a paper that explores that same hypothesis albeit in an isomorphic way. I finalise with an explanation of my motivation to answer this question.


Setting – A Short History

My historical tendency is to pursue a set of things which that hold a family resemblance but that I cannot put my finger into.

These comprise objective knowledge, certainty, scientific realism, cold analysis, intellect, rationality.

This interest culminated in the absorption of LW (minus the non-rationality parts). I kept going and pushing on rationality and as I dug into the literature I found out how it wasn’t nearly as uniform as I expected. At the same time I got pushed away from GOFAI – my natural inclination – into embodied cognition. I was surrounded by constructivists and cyberneticians. At the same time I was doing work on emotions, meditating a bunch, and reading up on levels of development.

And all these pushed me away from the LW-X-rationality (which I’m using as a handle to the things that share the family-resemblance above) and into narrative rationality. (Ribbonfarm being the prime online example.)

(But note that narrative rationality can be done in an analytic fashion, of which Nozick’s Invariance is an example. Nozick says “My own philosophical bent is to open possibilities for consideration. Not to close them. This book suggests new philosophical views and theses, and the reasons it produces for these are meant to launch them for exploration, not to demonstrate conclusively that they are correct. Similarly, my criticisms of some major competing theories or positions are not intended to refute them conclusively, merely to weaken them enough to clear a philosophical space in which the newly proposed views can breathe and grow.”)


Solution – A Hypothesis

And so I’ve been trying to figure out how to syncretise from these two attractors. A way forward is suggested by Vladimir:

“Unfortunately I don’t know how to switch someone over from the dangerous attractor of “narrative rationality” (basically, attachment to self-generated deep wisdom) to actual rationality.”

Why would you want to do this anyway? What we have in terms of “actual rationality,” as you call it, is often excellent for detecting bullshit, but it’s still largely impotent when it comes to generating interesting hypotheses and novel insight about many (if not most) interesting questions. In contrast, smart people who follow the “narrative” path will inevitably end up producing lots of nonsense in the process, but as long as you avoid getting carried away and take care to apply a bullshit filter to their output consistently, what remains will often contain otherwise unreachable gems of insight. Even when the “narrative” attractor lowers the average accuracy of beliefs of people who fall into it, the value of their output for a careful reader may still be higher than if they were restrained by more stringent intellectual standards.

My hypothesis is that narrative rationality works as a generator, whilst LW-X-rationality works as a selector. One creates, the other selects (for truth). Add retention and you have the recipe for the evolution of something.

I like this idea. I like how it vibes with what David said here: “For Bayesian methods to even apply, you have to have already defined the space of possible evidence-events and possible hypotheses and (in a decision theoretic framework) possible actions. The universe doesn’t come pre-parsed with those. Choosing the vocabulary in which to formulate evidence, hypotheses, and actions is most of the work of understanding something. Bayesianism gives you no help with that. Thus, I expect it predisposes you take someone else’s wrong vocabulary as given.” And by vibes I mean it is isomorphic. Narrative rationality is incredible for generating your own parsing and vocabulary, whilst lw-x-rationality allows you to select (by falsifying some stories).

Whilst this thinking was going on I found out someone that was living through the same dilemma, in a related, albeit different way.

Heylighen, attempting to unify the scientific (lw-rationality) and narrative (narrative rationality) modes of looking at the world proposed to do so by replacing “the fundamental metaphor “the universe is a clockwork mechanism”, by the metaphor “life is an adventure””.

This resonated so strongly it’s not even funny. Below I summarise the paper.


Life as adventure – unifying science and narrative


Whilst the scientific and narrative modes seem opposed – science trying to formulate objective, timeless, contextless laws, narrative describing a particular sequence of events happening to particular subjects in particular contexts – they both aim to “provide dependable knowledge, by formulating rules about how agents are supposed to behave in different circumstances”. That is, at a meta-level they both serve the function of “a guiding framework that helps us to act, to decide, and to understand the complex world we live in.”

The paper’s approach takes an agent view, after acknowledging that “there are context-dependent limits to knowledge (…) [which]  preclude the existence of an omniscient observer like the demon of Laplace, and therefore the possibility of predicting with certainty.”

(The author called these “horizons of knowability”. Simon and Gigerenzer talk about these a lot, although with the name of “bounded rationality.)

It also entails that “any realistic model of behavior will have to take into account uncertainty, mystery and surprise.” Following the Cybernetics and Complex Adaptive Systems paradigms it is show that agents cope effectively with uncertainty “by using regulation to counteract unforeseen disturbances and exploration to discover novel affordances.”



He uses navigation as the way to combine regulation, exploration and exploitation. Navigations is “setting out and following a course of action while taking into account any foreseen or unforeseen diversions.” A course of action is not “a predetermined trajectory but as an adventure, i.e. a goal-directed activity affected by unpredictable and often mysterious encounters.”

An agent trying to maximize its fitness will “apply a judicious combination of regulation (moving away from known disturbances), exploitation (moving towards known affordances) and exploration (moving into the unknown). Together, these steering mechanisms determine the process of navigation.”

This conceptualisation of navigation is consonant with  Campbell’s [1949] analysis of the hero’s journey, the “basic storyline for all myths, legends and fairy tales: the hero (agent) in a quest (search) for a magical boon (fitness enhancing resource) explores a mysterious world (uncertain environment), having to overcome difficult trials (disturbances), while sometimes receiving unexpected aid or making surprising discoveries (affordances).”

This “agent’s goal-directed navigation through an environment that throws up unforeseen challenges and opportunities may be likened to a quest or search.”

“Exploration means venturing into the unknown with the intention of discovering new information, resources, opportunities, or—most generally— affordances. It implies a course of action that is moving away from what is foreseeable (what we will later call “prospect”), and towards what is not (what we will call “mystery”).” The difference between what is foreseeable and what is not follows from the notion of “horizons of knowability”.

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Mystery allows one to experience “the anticipation of mystery. Literary examples of the sentiment are readily found in the genre of magical realism [Zamora & Faris, 1995], which may be exemplified by authors such as Franz Kafka, Gabriel García Márquez and Haruki Murakami. Stories in this genre typically describe ordinary, realistic courses of action that are gradually mixed up with strange, seemingly inexplicable events and coincidences—as if some –  magical realm is intruding into the everyday world. This generates step-by-step a sense of mystery. However, the mystery is rarely formulated explicitly, and never truly resolved, thus sustaining a “magical” atmosphere impervious to rational analysis.”

“More generally, a strong excitement, feeling of freedom and sense of adventure is created by the sensation of movement along an irregular terrain, so that the vista continuously changes, and things that were hidden (mystery) come into plain view (prospect), while those that were clearly to be seen (prospect) disappear again behind the horizon (mystery). This sensation is efficiently exploited in many computer games, where the gamer can steer a car, motorcycle or a running “avatar” through a virtual, 3-dimensional landscape containing plenty of surprises. This sensation may also explain the intense pleasure that people can experience while hiking through forests and hills, or driving a motorcycle or car along a scenic, winding road. This joyful experience can be seen as an instance of flow: a feeling of total absorption into an activity that is accompanied by a sense of being in control and the vanishing of all anxiety, doubt and self-consciousness [Csikszentmihalyi, 1990]. People are likely to experience flow when the following conditions are met: • their activity has clear goals; • they receive immediate feedback on the actions they perform. • the degree of difficulty or challenge of the task remains in balance with their level of skill. The first two rules express the essence of the cybernetic paradigm of regulation, while the third one implicitly adds the exploration necessary to find a new challenge (affordance or disturbance) when the present one has been met.” These three rules together add up to the “flow-producing dynamic of mysteries”

Whereas in the Newtonian worldview the horizon of knowability had the parameter “prospect” either at zero (system) or at infinity (Scientist/god/laplace demon), the “life is an adventure” perspective is a generalises the Newtonian worldview by allowing this parameter to  “vary continuously, from zero towards infinity (but without ever reaching the latter limit).

“By turning the constant “prospect” into a variable, the ontology of adventure brings the creativity, uncertainty and adaptivity of life, mind and society back into the scientific modelling paradigm”



“The agent’s course is visualized as a trail left behind by the agent’s movements across the virtual space. This makes it possible to examine a course of action both in “narrative mode” as a real-time succession of movements, and in “scientific mode” as a fixed trajectory. ” A single run  “can be seen as a virtual adventure, idiographically describing the things happening to a specific agent in a specific context. However, when a large number of such unique runs have been generated (differing in the values of random diversions or the initial state of the agent), it becomes possible to perform a statistical analysis of the outcomes, in order to discover possibly invariant “laws” that nomothetically apply to all “adventures”.” Such a series of simulations might “find out that agents who use a particular system of rules are more fit—in the sense of successfully exploiting affordances and avoiding disturbances and thus surviving—than those following different rules [Gershenson, 2004].”

“The formulation of such “rules of behavior” is the implicit goal of both narrative and scientific worldviews. The typical function of myths, fairy tales and fables is to teach the audience various rules of good behavior—both in the sense of moral and ethical values (…), and in the more pragmatic sense of problem-solving strategies (e.g. get informed well before undertaking a major enterprise, exercise in order to build physical strength). These rules are taught by illustrative stories in which the heroes who follow these rules fare well, while those who do not get in trouble. The scientific worldview eschews any notion of moral values, formulating rules or laws as “the way agents behave” rather than “the way agents ought to behave”. But an accurate description of how things tend to behave is easily and naturally translated into a strategy for making things behave more effectively, as the endless technological and social applications of science illustrate. In that sense, as many observers have pointed out, science is much less “neutral” or “value-free” in its implications than it theoretically claims to be: the neutral observation that some phenomenon A (e.g. smoking) tends to cause some other phenomenon B (e.g. cancer), where B is generally considered to have negative (or positive) value, will automatically lead to a negative (positive) evaluation of A”



Mark has written: “On the one hand, it’s fine to read stories backwards into your life, to selectively edit and mould your past, to give it a coherent narrative. The literature shows that humans do this. And that’s probably healthy and necessary, if those stories don’t get used for future mis-predictions.

What I’m interested in here, though, is us living stories as they’re happening. I want to live *in* a story, that I’m writing as I go, and I want to live it right through the triumphant climax. The longer and bigger the story, the more satisfying.

Yes, reality is indifferent. Yes, reality is incidental chaos. Yes, the story is the property of my map not a property of the territory. But heroically shaping reality is fun, and painful, and gratifying. When you care you can get hurt, but you’re only alive if you care.”

And I’m like “Yes, exactly, I want this.” And this clarifies my interest in rationality, my interest in science, my interest in narrative.

My life is an adventure, of which I’m both hero and writer. Whilst on the one hand I want to and do intensely live it, on the other I want to have knowledge of the tropes that my story is running through and the universe my story is running in, so that I can craft the story I want.

S1, S2, and Superego

Brienne has posted on LW about simulating and deferring to more rational selves. The core idea is that you take an outside view on yourself and then act based on that outside view. “What would rational-me do in this situation?” and then do that.
I think this is a great idea. I also think it is a terrible idea. Following I explain why.


This can be a really good hack. It clearly has worked for Brienne.
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy is this, in a nutshell. You stop struggling with whatever is happening, trying to flee from it, and
instead accept and embrace it and you act in a way that respects your values despite how you feel, despite what-it’s-like to be you in that moment. You just keep going, you just soldier on.
You (in LW- speak) let go off the inside view and take the outside view on yourself instead. “What would you have wanted to do?” You (in ACT-speak) stop being fused with your thoughts, evaluating and avoiding your experience, and reason-giving for your behaviour. And instead you accept your reactions, you recall the values you have decided as being the more important to you, and you act on them. (ACT, get it?)
And ACT apparently works.


Besides the necessary note that Brienne has been doing meditation for a whole lot of time and thus has muscles you don’t know you have, I think this can be terrible for other reasons.
Kahneman has conclusively shown that humans fail to behave according to the normative standards of rationality, probability and logic. And maybe they can get better, but there is no evidence from this from debiasing research thus far. Further, if Gigerenzer is correct, there can be no debiasing in principle, for the most part.
And thus what Brienne framed as outsourcing to rational-Brienne is actually outsourcing to a particular normative frame that you think works/is good/desirable.
And this leads to the problem of normativity: you really don’t want to choose the wrong normative frame and constantly S2 override your S1 desired because of it. As Mark said:
“And, geez, I say this all the time, but with great power comes great responsibility. You should be really, really, really, really sure that this isn’t one of those times that System 1 is being brilliant, not stupid. Otherwise, you hurt yourself if you override repeatedly. (Like, maybe you should eat those mixed nuts, because maybe you need that selenium–and people typically lose weight eating nuts, anyway–but, yeah, that selenium. System 1 is brilliant, in its own way.)

And there are certain games where System 1 always wins in the end, like with sexuality. You use System 2 to constructively engage with System 1. Otherwise, System 1 will eat you alive. It’s like the alcoholic who somehow convinces themselves that walking into the bar is precisely what they need to do to keep from having a drink.

For some things, System 1 always wins in the end, if you fight it head on–a very dangerous long-term game to play.”

You can match the S2 mind to the public and private mind, and the S1 mind to the experiential mind. One way of causing massive trouble for yourself is to take whatever normative systems society gives you and let them slide from your public mind into your private mind and actually overriding your S1 to be able to behave according to them. Some part of you will literally embody this system.
And this is problematic. So problematic and so frequent that we need super-ego therapies to deal with these overgrown agents. (The super-ego being, of course, just the internalisation of societal normative systems.)

Conclusion, sort of

I don’t have a solution (Did I ever?) but noticing this is a problem is of value. I agree with Hilbert that formulating a problem is half of the solution. I feel that one quarter is recognising that you have a problem, and that is where such analyses help and stuff like Focusing are invaluable.

Developmental views and rationality

I commence this essay with a quote about the use of a developmental view on political theorizing. Not going into politics (something I’m not doing before figuring out how to talk about socially dangerous topics), I build of that quote to talk about developmental views. I use those to touch upon ego development levels. The essay ends with speculations about the relationship between ego development, rationality, and postrationality.


Hanfeizi writes about a developmental view of politics:

“I think I know what you’re getting at, but it seems to me the real issue is that we need to break out of the right-left paradigm altogether and start looking at these issues developmentally.

Have you or Scott ever taken a look at the work of Don Beck (based on that of Clare Graves) and Spiral Dynamics? Or Ken Wilber’s Integral Philosophy (despite some of it’s troubles)? Here’s a good breakdown of the SDi Integral Model:


Wilber identifies that as clean as this model might look, each of the vMEMEs (levels) is capable of being distorted in various ways. He likes to talk about the “Mean Green Meme”- his name for what we would call SJWs and the politically correct establishment. Neoreaction seems to be a confused reaction against this- it’s groping towards a Yellow vMEME point of view, but tends to throw out everything Green rather than properly integrating it. The difference between the technocommercialists (Moldbug and Land, et al) and the ethnonationalists (Anissimov and Bayne, et al) is that the former are groping towards something higher, if not quite hitting the mark; whereas the latter are really full-on reactionaries who want to regress to the lower memes, embracing selfish power gods views (Red), ethnic tribal conformity (Blue), and to some extent Orange rationality- but wanting nothing to do with Green at all.”


Developmental views

Developmental psychology is the scientific study of changes that occur in human beings over the course of their life. Originally concerned with infants and children, the field has expanded to include adolescence, adult development, aging, and the entire lifespan.”

Jean Piaget was one of the fields commencers, and he was studying the cognitive development of children. He broke it into 4 stages:

  • Sensorimotor stage
    • “From birth to age two. The children experience the world through movement and their five senses. During the sensorimotor stage children are extremely egocentric, meaning they cannot perceive the world from others’ viewpoints.”
  • Preoperational stage
    • “Piaget’s second stage, the pre-operational stage, starts when the child begins to learn to speak at age two and lasts up until the age of seven. During the Pre-operational Stage of cognitive development, Piaget noted that children do not yet understand concrete logic and cannot mentally manipulate information. Children’s increase in playing and pretending takes place in this stage. However, the child still has trouble seeing things from different points of view. The children’s play is mainly categorized by symbolic play and manipulating symbols. Such play is demonstrated by the idea of checkers being snacks, pieces of paper being plates, and a box being a table. Their observations of symbols exemplifies the idea of play with the absence of the actual objects involved. By observing sequences of play, Piaget was able to demonstrate that, towards the end of the second year, a qualitatively new kind of psychological functioning occurs, known as the Pre-operational Stage.”
  • Concrete operational stage
    • “From ages seven to eleven. Children can now conserve and think logically (they understand reversibility) but are limited to what they can physically manipulate. They are no longer egocentric. During this stage, children become more aware of logic and conservation, topic previously foreign to them. Children also improve drastically with their classification skills.”
  • Formal operational stage
    • “From age eleven to sixteen and onwards (development of abstract reasoning). Children develop abstract thought and can easily conserve and think logically in their mind. Abstract thought is newly present during this stage of development. Children are now able to think abstractly and utilize metacognition. Along with this, the children in the formal operational stage display more skills oriented towards problem solving, often in multiple steps.”

Jean piaget worked with children. The formal operation stage is “(…) widely considered the adult stage in much of Western culture; and society and institutions support and reward its achievement. A citizenry capable of rational deliberation and choice based on pertinent criteria (not external features, sameness or tradition) would seem to be a necessary precondition for democracy to work. Only such a perspective and rational assessment of choices can safeguard the whole and at the same time allow changes to be reflected in the laws.” (1)

You can imagine that at some point in time we started hitting this level. Certainly it was not achieved 100.000 years ago, and certainly it is today, so at some point, there was a transition.

You might wonder if maybe this is not the last level, maybe it doesn’t stop there. This wondering has led to various theories in the developmental psychology subfield of adult development.

This wondering leaves you open to consider the levels above yours. As Mark said “[A]ctually, I am a Southern Baptist. And so are you. There are many levels above your own. What level makes yours look like a Southern Baptist’s looks to you?“

Loevinger made the most well studied model of levels of ego development. In her model there are ten stages and stage 5 is the formal operations stage. Cook-greuter has since severely expanded Loevinger’s work.

A possible complication is that one needs to be at a certain level of development to be able to treat their level of development as an object: there is a bit of bootstrapping involved.

Now, I realize all this talk sounds spiritual as hell. Mark, again, comments on how to interact with this stuff, by implicitly operating in the following way:

“ “Based on the everything I know about everything, what does the content of this human artifact, and the fact that I’m reading it, tell me about the structure and state of reality, if anything? And, given all that, what do I do next?”

In other words, you look at the methods, you look at statistical power, you look at p-values, you look at effect sizes, and you decide whether or not some of this stuff has maybe nailed down a little patch of reality, a little isolated map that can make some accurate predictions of the territory. You have to do the extra work of finding the signal in the noise, and you have to do the extra work of translating the map into language and concepts that might or might not hook up with the rest of science. But empiricism is empiricism, if you take responsibility for interpreting it, and if you choose to make use of the thousands of hours that well-intentioned people have put in.”


After rationality

Hanfeizi continues “Our host seems to have a view somewhere in the Turquoise band, OTOH- he seems to have been able to transcend and include everything worthwhile in both the Green (SJ, et al) and Yellow (NR, et al) vMEMEs and push on to something new- which, as we saw in “Meditations on Moloch”, borders on the spiritual.”

I feel that rationality (by which I mean LW-X-Rationality) can go wrong in several ways. Some ways are related to meaning and worldview and eternalism, other way – it seems to me – is that it anchors people in the formal operations stage. They get really good at playing that game and don’t want to stop playing.

Postrationality seems to be a reaction to that game. It might go beyond it. (Although I’m going to have to wait until the sequence comes out to make a judgement.)

I think LW-X-Rationality is an amazing scaffold because it is an in-depth, explicit, operationalization of what playing formal operations properly is like.

I think LW is a Wittgenstein Ladder. The Wittgenstein Ladder is the second-to-last proposition in the Tractatus: “My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.” I don’t think it is by chance that Wittgenstein ideas in the Tractatus – logical atomism, logical positivism, being quiet about metaphysics – resemble those of Less Wrong. But, Wittgenstein did recognize that you needed to go beyond these. (Which he did, in his second book.)

The question is, what comes after rationality? Is it postrationality? What is post-formal operations like? What does transrationality look like?

  1. http://www.cook-greuter.com/Cook-Greuter%209%20levels%20paper%20new%201.1’14%2097p%5B1%5D.pdf